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Priscilla A. Hayden-Roy

T ILL E ULENSPIEGEL ’ S T RANSGRESSIONS A GAINST
C ONVENTION : I NTERPRETING THE P ARASITE
With Peter Honegger’s1 discovery in 1971 that the Brunswickian tax collector, Hermann Bote, was the author of Till Eulenspiegel (TE), literary
research was able to situate the chapbook in a more accurate and specific
context than had previously been possible. Bote’s other works, along
with what we know of his life, indicate that he was a strong supporter
of the Hanseatic cities and the ruling patriciate, that he opposed the political uprisings of the guildsmen as he experienced them in Brunswick,
and that he espoused a view of corporate unity within the city through
the perpetuation of the estates.2 Many literary critics have concluded
1. Peter Honegger: Ulenspiegel. Ein Beitrag zur Druckgeschichte und zu Verfasserfrage. Neumünster 1973. In 1971 Honegger presented his findings at the
annual meeting of the Niederdeutscher Sprachverein in Hildesheim. (See Hermen Bote. Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung. Beiträge zum Hermen-BoteKolloquium vom 3. Oktober 1981 in Braun schweig. Ed. Herbert Blume, Werner Wunderlich. Göppingen 1982, pp. 3–11, here p. 4.)

Published in Daphnis: Zeitschrift für Mittlere Deutschen
Literatur, band 20, heft 1 (1991), 7–31. Copyright © 1991
Editions Rodopi BV. Used by permission.

2. What belongs to Hermann Bote’s oeuvre is still a matter of debate among
literary critics. See the bibliography of Bote’s works compiled by Detlev Schöttker and Werner Wunderlich (In: Hermen Bote, p. 135-139). Bernd-Ulrich
Hucker (Bote, Hermen. In: Lexikon des Mittelalters. Vol. 2. Munich, Zurich
1983, cols. 482-484) presents a dissenting view of what constitutes Bote’s oeuvre. For biographical essays on Bote, see Wolfgang Lindow: Herman Bote —
Leben und Werk. Eine Einführung. In: Hermen Bote, p. 3-11; Gerhard Cordes:
Bote, Hermen (Hermann). In: Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon. 2nd ed. Vol. 1. Berlin, NY 1978, col. 967-970; George C. Schoolfield: Hermann Bote. An Introductory Essay. In: German Studies in Honor of
Otto Springer. Ed. Stephen J. Kaplowitt. Pittsburg 1978, p. 281-303. The study
of Bote’s social and political views opens onto the history of early modern
7
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that with TE Hermann Bote wished to exhort, albeit in an entertaining
manner, members of his society to beware of the forces threatening to
destroy its all too fragile order.3 This appears to undercut the validity of
interpretations of Till as a plebian folk hero, or even a proto-proletarian revolutionary force.4 While the text itself can be construed to portray Till as a positive hero or an emancipatory force, authorial intention
____________
Brunswick. See Max L. Baeumer: “Ohn Tumult/ ohn Schwermerey”: Literarische Evidenz zum ‘revolutionären’ Charakter der Reformation in Braunschweig. In: Wolfenbütteler Beiträge 4 (1981), p. 59-1 10; Olaf Mörke: Rat und
Bürger in der Reformation. Soziale Gruppen und kirchlicher Wandel in den
welfischen Hansestädten Luneburg, Braunschweig und Göttingen. Hildesheim
1983. Mörke (esp. p. 79-85) questions some of the findings of the earlier study
by Werner Spieß: Geschichte der Stadt Braunschweig im Mittelalter. Vom
Ausgang des Mittelalters bis zum Ende der Stadtfreiheit (1491-1671). Braunschweig 1966.
3. See, for example, Werner Wunderlich: Einleitung. In: Eulenspiegel- Interpretationen. Der Schalk im Spiegel der Forschung 1807-1977. Ed. Werner
Wunderlich. Munich 1979, pp. 7-14, here p. 11; Hans Wiswe: Sozialgeschichtliches um Till Eulenspiegel 11. Eine Nachlese. In: Eulen- spiegel-Interpretationen, pp. 175-18 1, here p. 179; Max L. Baeumer: Die sozialen Verhältnisse
und der sozialkritische Charakter der Volksliteratur im braunschweigischen
Raum mr Zeit des ‘Dyl Vlenspiegel’. In: Eulenspiegel-Jahrbuch (1985), pp.
33-47, esp. p. 38, 39, 46-47.
4. See, for example, Ingeborg Spriewald: Vom ‘Eulenspiegel’ zum ‘Simplizissimus’. Zur Genese des Realismus in den Anfängen der deutschen Prosaerzählung. Berlin 1974. Spriewald finds in the chapbook a “Grundlinie des
Opponierens und sozialen Protests” (p. 57) directed against “Obrigkeit und
ständische Beengung” (p. 94). An interesting attempt to maintain the validity of authorial intention, while at the same time legitimating a view of Till as
“Held der kleinen Leute” is found in Georg Bollenbeck: Till Eulenspiegel. Der
dauerhafte Schwankheld. Zum Verhältnis von Produktions- und Rezeptionsgeschichte. Stuttgart 1985. Bollenbeck claims that Bote’s subject material turned
itself against his intentions: “Eulenspiegel ist für den traditionsorientierten
Zollschreiber akzeptabel,weil er als Außenstehender das morsche Ständegerüst
scheinbar nicht gefährdet, er kann aber gerade deshalb, und dies widerspricht
Botes Konzept, dessen Unterminierung aufzeigen.” (p. 66) Thus he maintains
that the reception history of TE provides just as valid interpretations of the
work as authorial intention does.
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rules that Bote would not have wanted to sow the seeds of discontent
and rebellion among the lower classes with his socially displaced, itinerant prankster. If we raise the question of the book’s reception in the
16th century, evidence indicates that our postulated authorial intention
was communicated quite successfully to the chapbook’s readership.5
Contemporary adaptations of TE by Hans Sachs and Fischart, for example, exploit the chapbook’s moralizing, didactic potential.6 On the
other hand, we also know that TE was placed on the index of forbidden
books in 1569 published in Antwerp by the Duke of Alba in the name
of Emperor Philipp II.7 This suggests that some authorities in the 16th
century may have perceived the work to be seditious, although this certainly was not the author’s intention.
This brings us to a fundamental interpretative question: does authorial intention determine the meaning of a text? The school of pragmatic
linguistics known as speech act theory (SAT) is generally the first cited
in defense of authorial intention. While initially developed to analyze
spoken communication, John R. Searle8 has argued that the same principle obtains for fictional discourse: fiction is a sort of “pretended” discourse, he says, and “pretend” is an intentional verb. Thus the whole
work of fiction derives from the author’s intention to engage in this
form of discourse. But the status of authorial intention has come under
fire of late, particularly from the deconstructionists. The disagreement
was first articulated in a debate between Jacques Derrida and John R.
Searle, which was published in the first two issues of Glyph.9
5. Bollenbeck: Till Eulenspiegel, p. 170-203.
6. Ibid., 192-198.
7. Ibid., 201; Honegger: Ulenspiegel, p. 57 ff.
8. John R. Searle: The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse. In: John R.
Searle: Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. London,
NY 1979, p. 58-75.
9. Jacques Derrida: Signature Event Context. In: Glyph. John Hop- kins Textual Studies 1 (1977), pp. 172-197; John R. Searle: Reiterating the Differences. A
Reply to Derrida. In: Glyph 1 (1977), p. 198-208; Jacques Derrida: Limited Inc
a b c . . . In: Glyph 2 (1977), p. 162-254. See also Manfred Frank: Die Entropie der Sprache. Überlegungen zur Debatte Searle-Derrida. In: Manfred Frank:
Das Sagbare und das Unsagbare.
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Derrida’s article “Signature Event Context”, originally presented as a
lecture in 1971 at the Congrès international des Sociétés de philosophie
de langue française in Montreal, initiated the debate. In this article
Derrida calls into question the notion of context as a rigorous, scientific
concept able to determine meaning. The empirical saturation of context is rendered impossible, he argues, by the very nature of communication, which depends on the iterability of its signs. Speaker intention is equally unable to provide an anchoring context. Here he takes
issue with the “father” of SAT, John Austin, who in his seminal How To
Do Things With Words10 excludes “non-serious” or “parasitic” language
from his discussion of “ordinary” language, specifically the speech act
he calls the “performative”. The passage under question reads:
As utterances our performatives are also heir to certain other kinds of ill
which infect all utterances. And these likewise, though again they might
be brought into a more general account, we are deliberately at present excluding. I mean, for example, the following: a performative utterance will,
for example, be in a peculiar way hollow and void if said by an actor on
the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies
in a similar manner to any and every utterance — a sea-change in special
circumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways — intelligibly — used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use —
ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of language. All this
we are excluding from consideration. Our performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances.11

Derrida objects that what Austin has excluded “as anomaly, exception,
‘non-serious,’ citation . . . is the determined modification of a general citationality — or rather, a general iterability — without which there would
____________
Studien zur neuesten französischen Hermeneutik und Texttheorie. Frankfurt/
M. 1980, p. 141-210; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: Revolutions that as Yet Have
No Model. Derrida’s Limited Inc. In: Diacritics 10 (December 1980), p. 29-49;
Stanley E. Fish: With the Compliments of the Author. Reflections on Austin and
Derrida. In: Critical Inquiry 8 (Summer 1982), p. 693-721.
10. J. L. Austin: How to Do Things with Words. J.O. Urmson, Marina Sbisa,
eds. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass. 1975.
11. Ibid, p. 21 f.
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not even be a ‘successful’ performative.”12 He grants that while there is a
“relative specificity” of performatives determined by speaker intention, a
“structural unconsciousness . . . prohibits any saturation of the context.”13
Searle responded in a brief article entitled, “Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida”.14 He upholds Austin’s distinction between
“ordinary” and “parasitic” discourse as valid: “We do not, for example, hold the actor responsible today for the promise he made on stage
last night in the way that we normally hold people responsible for their
promises.”15 And he defends Austin’s exclusion as merely a “research
strategy”, arguing that ordinary language is “logically prior” to parasitic language, and that “relatively simpler problems” are justifiably the
starting point for a “general theory of speech acts”.16 To Derrida’s denial that intention can “never be through and through present to itself
and to its context”,17 Searle counters: “In serious literal speech the sentences are precisely the realizations of the intentions: there need be no
gulf at all between illocutionary intention and its expression. The sentences are, so to speak, fungible intentions.”18
In another essay devoted to the “logical status of fictional discourse”,
Searle maintains that the work of fiction as a whole is a serious utterance: it conveys a serious “message or messages” through the performance of the pretended speech acts. These messages, he says, are
conveyed “by the text but are not in the text”, except in the case of “tiresomely didactic authors”.19 Thus a “serious” message, not necessarily
explicit within the fictional text, is communicated by “non-serious” or
parasitic language. According to SAT, the interpreter must consider authorial intention in order to distill the serious message which anchors
the text’s meaning.
12. Derrida: Signature Event Context, p. 191.
13. Ibid., p. 192.
14. See note 9.
15. Searle: Reply, p. 204.
16. Ibid., p. 205.
17. Derrida: Signature Event Context, p. 192.
18. Searle: Reply, p. 202.
19. Searle: The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse, p. 74.
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But in the case of Bote’s TE, we are confronted with an array of problems that call to mind Derrida’s objections to authorial intention as the
determinant of meaning. The work immediately confronts us with maneuvers that Bote employed to defer his liability for the authorship of
the work. First, he published it anonymously, hiding his identity in an
acrostic that, as it turned out, would be overlooked for 460 years. Second, in the foreword the anonymous author, calling himself “N”, further distanced the work from himself by placing the ground of its origin
on other anonymous persons: in 1500, he says, “etlich Personen” asked
him to collect the materials on the “behend listiger und durchtribener
. . . Buren Sun . . . genant Dil Ulenspiegel”.20 So Herman Bote was not
properly responsible for the work? But then a third problem surfaces:
the “seriousness” of Bote’s anonymous deferral itself becomes questionable when we consider that he was citing a standard literary form;
moreover John L. Flood recently uncovered a specific source for Bote’s
introduction in the introduction to Wigoleis vom Rade.21 Bote’s deferral
itself is a non-serious citation, so that we are uncertain whether we are,
by means of a double negation, deferred back to authorial intention,
or removed a step further from it. Finally, the anonymous author purports that the work serves nothing other than a non-serious purpose:
“Nun allein umb ein frölich Gemüt zu machen in schweren Zeiten, und
die Lesenden und Zuhörenden mögen gute kurtzweilige Fröden und
Schwänck daruß fabulleren.”22 The author wishes to prevent his book
from being attached to any program other than entertainment; he specifically denies that the book was written to annoy or criticize anybody.
If we assume for the moment that Bote’s maneuvers in the foreword
serve as a sort of mask, behind which he hid his own identity and his
“real” authorial intention (which for reasons we will consider later, he
considered prudent to obscure), the next step would be to consider the
20. Ein kurtzweilig Lesen von Dil Ulenspiegel. Wolfgang Lindow, ed. Stuttgart 1978,p. 7.
21. John L. Flood: Der Prosaroman ‘Wigoleis vom Rade’ und die Entstehung
des ‘Ulenspiegel’. In: Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur
105 (1976), p. 151-165.
22. Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 7.
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Till episodes themselves. We will see in the following discussion how an
analysis based on SAT yields an interpretation in agreement with what
we posited as Bote’s likely authorial intention, as extrapolated from his
other writings. But we will also see that the means by which Bote chose
to exhort his society — the social outcast and parasite who transgresses
against the whole spectrum of medieval society — yields alternative interpretations when the pranks, the parasitic or non-serious language of
the outcast, are taken seriously.
Before we continue with these analyses, one more observation should
be made concerning the debate between Derrida and Searle. Derrida responded to Searle’s “Reply” in a lengthy second essay, “Limited Inc a b
c ...”,23 in which he puts forward an “ethico-political” critique of speech
act theory. He questions Searle’s insistence that the terms “parasitic”,
“non-serious”, “infelicitous”, “impure”, etc., employed by Austin are
properly theoretical, or that they merely signify “logical dependence”.24
Derrida sees in this moral terminology an “ethico-political language”25
that exposes the ideological foundations of SAT:
I am convinced that speech act theory is fundamentally . . . a theory of
right or law, of convention, of political ethics or of politics as ethics. It describes . . . the pure conditions of an ethical-political discourse insofar as
this discourse involves the relation of intentionality to conventionality or
to rules . . . [T]his “theory” is compelled to reproduce, to reduplicate in itself the law of its object or its object as law; it must submit to the norm it
purports to analyze. Hence, both its fundamental, intrinsic moralism and
its irreducible empiricism.26

The distinction between “serious” and “non-serious” or “ordinary” language inevitably becomes political, insofar as the conventions defining
“normalcy” are entrenched in social relationships of power. SAT designates as “pure”, “felicitous”, etc. only those speech acts which conform
to the rules governing “right” conventional discourse. Derrida’s notion
of iterability, on the other hand, makes transgression against convention
23. See note 9.
24. Derrida: Limited Inc, p. 234 f.
25. Ibid., p. 240.
26. Ibid., p. 240.
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a fundamental possibility of language: “Once this parasitism or fictionality can always add another parasitic or fictional structure to whatever has preceded it . . . everything becomes possible against the language-police; for example ‘literatures’ or ‘revolutions’ that as yet have
no Context and intention do indeed relatively specify the meaning of an
utterance, but they cannot “govern the entire scene and system of utterance”.28 Convention bolstered by the force of social relationships of
power enforces a “normal” meaning and banishes the unconventional
meaning as “fiction”. But this policing of language cannot guarantee
“pure” speech acts. It is constantly under siege:
If the police is always waiting in the wings, it is because conventions are
by essence violable and precarious, in themselves and by the fictionality that constitutes them, even before there has been any overt transgression . . . 29

This quotation brings us to the topic of this paper, the proper interpretation of transgression in Hermann Bote’s TE. Should we understand
Till’s transgressions against society as an admonition to protect an all
too precarious social order? Or can they be construed positively as a relativizer of social norms, insofar as they expose the violability of the status quo? SAT and deconstruction in competition with each other provide a useful heuristic device in understanding how Till’s transgressions
generate opposing interpretations.
In his chapbook Bote portrays a broad spectrum of representatives
of society, from poor to rich, artisans, nobility, ecclesiastical figures,
and their interaction with Till, a socially marginalized vagrant, a Gouckler and Spilman. On the one hand we find the “inside” group protected
by convention and occupying a position within the community; on the
other hand, the outsider, the “non-serious” prankster, who survives
“parasitically” by masking himself as a member of the “inside” group,
only to be banished once his pranks expose him as a fraud. As a vagrant
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and Gouckler Till belonged to the socially declassed group of the dishonorable” (unehrliche Leute). The dishonorable and their progeny
were denied membership in the guilds; they could not be legal heirs
or guardians; they could not prosecute; they could not take oaths, and
thus could prove their innocence only by ordeal. Their ranks included
a surprisingly large spectrum of people: gravediggers, executioners,
knackers, nightwatchmen, bathhouse overseers, barbers, millers, weavers, and shepherds.30 Hermann Bote accentuated the tabu against Till
even further by designating him a “Schalck”. Hans Wiswe has observed
that the term had a considerably more pejorative meaning at the close
of the Middle Ages than we find even by the eighteenth century.31 Luther translates the polluti in the Vulgate (Jer. 23: 1 1) as Schelke, and
the serve nequam of Matth. 18:32 as Schalkknecht.32 In his Schichtboik Bote himself refers to those instigating the guildsmen’s uprising
as Schelke.33 The drastic discrepancy of social status between the actors in TE sets the stage for a confrontation between conventional language (as represented by the members of “proper” society) and a language of transgression (necessarily so, since Till intrudes into a space
not proper to himself when he speaks). These confrontations typically
occur when Till has been given a command by someone exercising authority over him. Such a situation is not infrequent, as Till often hires
himself out to an artisan, in order to live “parasitically” for a few days
under the guise of an apprentice or helper. The smooth functioning of
the artisan’s shop is dependent first upon the recognition of the master’s authority, and second upon linguistic convention, by which the
artisan’s commands are expressed, understood and carried out. Till violates the relationship between himself and his master by sidestepping
the conventional meaning of the command and “obeying” a non-conventional meaning.

30. Werner Danckert: Unehrliche Leute. Die verfemten Berufe. Berne, Munich 1963,esp. p. 9-20.
27. Ibid., p. 243.

31. Hans Wiswe: Sozialgeschichtliches um Till Eulenspiegel 11, p. 176 f.

28. Derrida: Signature Event Context, p. 192.

32. Ibid., p. 177f.

29. Derrida: Limited Inc, p. 250.

33. Werner Wunderlich (“Till Eulenspiegel”. Munich 1984, p. 28) lists several examples of Bote’s use of schalk in the Schichtboik.
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A typical example is found in the 20th episode, where Till hires himself out to a baker in Uelzen. The baker orders Till to sift flour during the night while the baker sleeps. According to Bollenbeck, ordering one’s help to work unsupervised violated traditional guild law.34
Till finds himself in this situation in many episodes,35 and it uniformly
provides him the opportunity to execute a prank. In light of Bollenbeck’s observation, the punitive or vengeful function of the prank becomes clearer: with it Bote can warn contemporary artisans to uphold
the traditional corporative ideal of work. In this episode Till lays a linguistic trap for the baker by protesting that he will need a light in order
to obey his master’s order. His master refuses to give him one; he will
have to sift by the moonlight as the previous help has done. Till complies, “Hon sie dann also hin gebütlet, so wil ich es auch tun.”36 While
the baker sleeps, Till holds the sifter out the window of the bakery,
letting the flour fall in the moonlight onto the dirt courtyard. Several
hours later the baker discovers his courtyard white with flour. “Waz
der Tüffel! Waz machst du hie? Hat daz Mel nit mer kostet, wann daz
du dez in den Treck bütelest?’he yells. Till responds innocently: “Hon
Ihr mich es nit geheissen in dem Mon bütelen sunder Liecht? Also
hab ich gethon.”37 The conventionally defined relationship of master
to servant establishes the framework within which the utterances between Till and the baker are exchanged. The nature of their speech
acts buttresses this relationship: the master gives directives, and the

34. “Zwar dingt in der Regel bis weit ins 15. Jahrhundert der Meister die
gesamte Arbeitskraft des Gesellen, zwar kann die Arbeitszeit bis zu 16 Stunden dauern, doch halten Meister und Geselle die gleiche Arbeitszeit ein und
bilden eine Werkgemeinschaft.” (Bollenbeck: Till Eulenspiegel, p. 104.)
Bollenbeck maintains that these episodes demonstrate a pervasive disintegration of a corporative means of production, symptomatic of the changing economic relationships in the late medievaL/early modern period.
35. See episodes 20, 39, 47, 48, 56, 62 (also cited in Bollenbeck: Till Eulenspiegel, p. 104).
36. Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 61.
37. Ibid., p. 61.
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servant promises to fulfill them. Let us examine these speech acts, using Searle’s taxonomy.38
The directive given by the baker to sift flour in the moonlight fits the
following formula:
! ↑ W (H does A)
!=

illocutionary point, in this case an attempt by the speaker to get
the hearer to do something. This will be the typical initial constellation between master (speaker) and servant (hearer).
↑=
“direction of fit” — an upturned arrow indicates the world should
be made to fit the words (as opposed to a declaration, where the
direction of fit is words to world [↓]).In our case the world within
the master’s workplace is to be made congruent to the master’s
word: the bags of unsifted flour shall be fitted to the master’s
words, “Sift the flour”.
W = the sincerity condition which indicates the psychological state of
the speaker. In this case the sincerity condition is Want — the
master wants the flour to be sifted.
(H does A) = the propositional content, or the actual task to be performed by the hearer. In this case, “Till sifts the flour in the
moonlight”, is the propositional content of the directive.
According to this formula the directive is broadly defined to include a
spectrum ranging from ordering, to asking, to entreating.39 Searle specifies within this spectrum by defining additional dimensions of variation, including that of social status differences between speaker and
hearer. He observes that this variation determines whether the asking
is a command (which presupposes a relationship of power/authority of
speaker over hearer) or a request (which may well indicate the speaker’s lack of power/authority over against the hearer).40 This restriction
is of utmost importance in the linguistic relationship between Till and
the master artisan, for by it the perlocutionary force of the statement
38. John R. Searle: A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts. In: Searle: Expression
and Meaning, p. 1-29, esp. p. 12-15.
39. Ibid., p. 14.
40. Ibid., p. 5 f.
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is socially legitimated. The hearer is bound to perform the command
in order to receive from the speaker the material benefits upon which
his (the hearer’s) existence depends. The linguistic convention “mastercommands-servant” is rooted in the socio-economic relationship between them and serves to perpetuate it. The only acceptable response to
the command is the promise to obey, which alone guarantees the felicity of the master’s statement.
Searle’s taxonomy of the promise (commissive)41 will make clear
what exactly the relationship between the baker’s command and Till’s
promise is. The promise formula is as follows:
C ↓ I (S does A)
C=

the illocutionary point which commits the speaker to some future course of action. In our case Till (now the speaker) commits
himself to the fulfillment of the baker’s command. Note again
the significance of social status in this promise: Till’s commitment is not autonomous or sovereign; it is a function of the command, the only response that can guarantee the felicity of the
command.
↑=
again the direction of fit is world to words. However, now the
speaker of the promise is also to be the agent of change.
I=
the sincerity condition of the speaker of the promise is Intention:
in our case Till indicates by the promise that he intends to perform the action described in the baker’s command.
(S does A) =the propositional content of the promise: the speaker shall
perform some future action “A”. This action “A” must be identical to that stated in the master’s command.
The servant’s promise to obey his master’s command is highly restricted. The illocutionary point of the utterance commits Till to what
his position as servant compels him to do, i.e. obey his master. The
propositional content of the promise is merely a repetition42 of that of
the master’s command, spoken now from the agent’s point of view. The
41. Ibid., p. 14f.
42. As we will see, herein lies the problem in the Till episode: for although
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promise uttered in response to the master’s command linguistically
mirrors the social relationship between master and servant, where the
servant is an extension and realizer of the master’s will.
But obviously Till did not carry out the command as intended; the
exchange of speech acts was, in the view of SAT, “infelicitous” or “defective”. In his Speech Acts Searle outlines the “necessary and sufficient
conditions for the act of promising to have been
____________
he repeats the baker’s command, he means something other than what the
baker did. Here, too, lies a point of difference between Searle and Derrida. Derrida denies the possibility of any “pure” repetition with his notion of iterability:
“Iterability supposes a minimal remainder (as well as a minimum of idealization) in order that the identity of the selfsame be repeatable and identifiable in,
through, and even in view of its alteration. For the structure of iteration — and
this is another of its decisive traits — implies both identity and difference. Iteration in its ‘purest’ form — and it is always impure — contains in itself the discrepancy of a difference that constitutes it as iteration.’’ (Derrida: Limited Inc,
p. 190.) Searle, on the other hand, misunderstands Derrida because he equates
iteration with repetition. In summing up what a “sympathetic reading” of Derrida might yield, Searle states that he has pointed out “that the possibility of
parasitic discourse is internal to the notion of language, and that performatives
can succeed only if the utterances are iterable, repetitions of conventional . . .
forms. But neither of these points is in any way an objection to Austin. Indeed,
Austin’s insistence on the conventional character of the performative utterance
in particular and the illocutionary act in general commits him precisely to the
view that performatives must be iterable, in the sense that any conventional
act involves the notion of repetition of the same.” (Searle: Reply, p. 207; emphasis is mine.) The distinction is at its profoundest a metaphysical one: Derrida’s structure of iterability displaces the concept of identity that is at the base
of any ontology. Spivak writes on this point: “One of the corollaries of the structure of alterity which is the revised version of the structure of identity is that every repetition is an alteration. This would put into question both a transcendental idealism that claims that the idea is infinitely repeatable as the same and
a speech act theory that bases its conclusions on intentions and contexts that
can be defined and transferred within firm outlines. Iterability is the name of
this corollary: every repetition is an alteration (iteration).” (Spivak: Revolutions
that as Yet Have No Model, p. 37.)
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successfully and non-defectively performed.”43 The first criterion is that
“normal input and output conditions obtain”. Included in this condition
is the Austinian exclusion of “parasitic forms of communication such
as telling jokes or acting in a play”.44 Till’s promise is disqualified from
the start, precisely because his language is parasitic; with his promise
he is setting up the joke he wants to play on the baker. To do this he
discovers an ambiguity in the command as the baker formulated it. To
“sift flour by the moonlight” can be interpreted to mean either “in the
moonlight shining through the windows of the bakery” or “directly in
the moonlight shining in the courtyard”. Convention and speaker intention seem to determine the context sufficiently as to render the directive unambiguous. But as Derrida has noted, “intention cannot govern
the entire scene and system of an utterance.”45 The strength of conventional meaning obscures the denotative space lying beyond the pale of
social convention and functions as a host, by means of which Till’s parasitic meaning can infect the conversation unnoticed. According to Derrida, the risk of this sort of “parasitism” constitutes the “internal and
positive condition of possibility” of communication in general. Moreover, to ban this sort of parasitism to “a kind of ditch or external place
of perditi0n”,46 as SAT would do, exposes the ideological foundation of
this theory as merely a reproduction of the law it purports to be analyzing. Searle continues in his analysis of the promise, distinguishing it
from a threat:
A promise is defective if the thing promised is something the promisee
does not want done; and it is further defective if the promisor does not
believe the promisee wants it done, since a non-defective promise must
be intended as a promise and not as a threat or warning.47

43. John R. Searle: Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.
Cambridge 1970, p. 54.
44. Ibid., p. 57.
45. Derrida: Signature Event Context, p. 192.
46. Ibid., p. 190.
47. Searle: Speech Acts, p. 58. In his discussion of this passage Derrida employs the psychoanalytical notion of the subconscious to point out the “structural ambivalence” of every desire. (Limited Inc, p. 215 f.)

Till Eulenspiegel’s Transgressions Against Convention

21

Seen in this light, Till’s “promise” to sift flour in the moonlight (meaning onto the courtyard) was a threat rather than a promise, for clearly
the baker did not want his supply of flour ruined. SAT would indeed
banish Till’s utterance into the domain of “defective” (or infelicitous)
speech acts: first, because it was a parasitic promise, and second, because it was really a threat masquerading in the linguistic trappings of
a promise. The law of non-defective promising simply retraces convention as it is reenforced by social relationships. And just as the parasitic
promise must be banished as “defective”, so, too, Till must be excluded
from “proper” society. Once the baker realizes he has been duped, he
sends Tiil away, calling him a Schalck, and thereby attributing to him
an identity opposite to that of the moral community. An analysis of this
episode according to SAT brings the “ethico-political” dimension of the
theory clearly to light: linguistic transgression as SAT defines it goes
hand in hand with what constitutes a transgression in the eyes of the
law, that is, the destruction of property. SAT reproduces in itself laws of
power and property that govern society and language.
If we leave the internal fictional world of TE for a moment and consider the work itself as the utterance of its author, Hermann Bote, we
must conclude that the interpretation yielded by SAT conforms with
what we know about the author’s political views. Till’s transgressions
stand as a warning to the artisans: by violating traditional guild practices, they may bring about the destruction of their business. If the corporative nexus is maintained, the parasitic Schalck will never be able
to infect it. But a Derridian reading of the transgression sees parasitism as a condition of all communication, so that no boundary, traditional or otherwise, can banish the infection. By demonstrating the
susceptibility of “normal” discourse to parasitic, “non-serious” discourse, the text calls the necessity of the normal into question and exposes it as mere convention, artifice. This is the first step in envisioning a new order, a new set of conventions. Clearly this revolutionary
interpretation lies beyond Bote’s intention, but its possibility lies, so
a Derridian interpretation would argue, in the structural ambiguity of
Till’s transgression.
We find this same ambiguity in the many scatological pranks in TE,
where we find the same tension between convention and non- convention at work. Let us consider by way of example the 77th episode, which
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relates Till’s stay at an inn in Nuremberg. Next door to the inn lives “ein
frum man, der was reich und gieng gern in die Kirchen”,48 a staunch
member of proper society who also wholeheartedly supports the social
tabus directed against the dishonorable class. He “vermöcht sich nit wol
der Spilleutt. Wa die waren oder kamen, da er was, da gieng er davon.”49
This rich man had the custom of giving an annual dinner for his neighbors, a sumptuous affair where food was lavish and the best wine
flowed freely. If the neighbors happened to have out-of-town guests —
merchants and the like — these were invited along as well, as long as
they, too, were “frum”, or honorable.50 One of these feasts takes place
while Till is in town. Till’s innkeeper, a neighbor of the rich man, is invited. Till, his guest, is not, because the rich man sees from Till’s dress
that he is a “Gouckler und Spilman”,51 i.e., dishonorable. Till is insulted,
but decides to behave in a manner appropriate to the designation given
him: “Bin ich ein Gouckeler, so sol ich ihm Goucklerei beweisen.”52 He
bores a hole through the wall of the rich man’s house and, equipped
with a pile of his own filth (“seins Trecks ein grossen Huffen”53), blows
the stench into the rich man’s dining hall with a bellows as all the
48. Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 221.
49. Ibid., p. 221.
50. “Und diser Man lud seinen Nachburen, als er für ein Gewonheit het,
und ihr Gäst, die sie hetten von frumen Leüten.” (Ibid., p. 222.) It is interesting to note that the rich man considered merchants sufficiently honorable that
he would invite them to his home. Bollenbeck (Till Eulenspiegel, p. 37-43) has
noted that the traditional medieval prejudices against the merchant are muted
in TE, because Bote, as a supporter of the Hanseatic cities, was relatively welldisposed to those representing a livelihood so essential to the Hanseatic economy. For this reason one must qualify Bote’s “conservatism”, insofar as his
urban perspective includes certain “progressive”, “bourgeois” aspects in distinction to the purely feudal interests of, say, the territorial princes. Bollenbeck’s
differentiated analysis adds an important socio-historical dimension to earlier,
flatter ascriptions of “conservatism” to Hermann Bote.
51. “Sunder Ulenspiegel lud er nit, den sahe er für ein Gouckler und
Spilman,die pflag er nit zu laden.” (Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 222.)
52. Ibid., p. 222.
53. Ibid., p. 222.
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guests are eating. At first everyone thinks the smell is coming from his
neighbor. (This is an interesting comment, for it indicates that the smell
is not essentially foreign to the illustrious crowd gathered there: even
honorable people can smell bad.) As the odor becomes more powerful they search all corners of the room for its source. Finally the stench
so overwhelms them that they are forced to leave the dinner. Here we
see the results of Till’s transgression: it pollutes the “inside” such that it
must be evacuated. Till’s innkeeper returns to his house, and after vomiting up his dinner (a more profound evacuation!), explains to Till how
horrible the rich man’s room had smelled. Till laughs and says:
Wolt mich der reich Man nit zu Gast laden und mir günnen seiner Kost?
Ich bin ihm doch vil günstiger getrüwer wann er mir, ich gun ihm doch
wol meiner Kost. Wär ich da gewesen, so hät es nit so ubel gestuncken.54

Having insinuated his culpability in the prank, Till hightails it out of
town. In his statement we see the same parasitic use of language as
in the previous episode. The “Kost” Till so “generously and faithfully”
grants the rich man is his own digested food, his excrement. According
to SAT this parasitic use of language must be excluded from ordinary
language, and we can see from the dialogue that follows that the rich
man would also be glad to exclude Till from his presence:
Der reich Man sprach: “Lieber Nachbuer, der Doren und Spillüt würt niemant gebessert, darumb wil ich deren nit mer in meinem Huß haben. Ist
mir nun dise Büberei also geschehen Euwers Huß halben, da kan ich nüt
zu,ich sah Euwern Gast an für einen Schalck.55

Till’s prank corresponds to the expectations the rich man has of the socially declassed and reinforces his prejudice. He assumes an ontological source for Till’s behavior: the prankster’s actions correspond to his
being, and the social definition of Unehrlichkeit correctly identifies this
being. The only way to protect the “insiders”, the ehrliche Leute, from
the effects of this Schalck is to banish him from the “inside”, from the
“home”.
But for the innkeeper, who is less well-off than the rich man, this is not
54. Ibid., p. 223.
55. Ibid., p. 223.
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possible. He is dependent on the patronage of all people, be they honorable or dishonorable. While he, too, makes the distinction between the
two groups, it is relativized by his own economic need. Unable to ban
the Schalck from his house, his only option is live with the anxiety and
increase his watchfulness:
Ulenspiegels Wirt sagt: “Lieber Wirt, Ihr haben wol gehört und ist auch
also: für ein Schalck sol man zwei Liecht setzen, und das muß ich wol
thun, dan ich muß allerlei halten. Einen Schalck muß man halten mit den
Besten, so jemant kumpt.”56

The innkeeper’s economic need effectively forces him to acknowledge
the parasitic relationship of honorable and dishonorable, so that the
presumed ontological divisions become shaky. This is still more the case
when we consider Till’s assertion that, had he been invited to the dinner, had the tabu against his class been set aside, the prank would have
been avoided. Seen from this perspective, Till’s prank reflects not who
he is, but how he is defined. As he himself says, his action is merely an
example of the Goucklerei “proper” to the Gouckler-essence assigned
him by the rich man. And his being defined as declassed outsider serves
the important societal function of guaranteeing the existence of an inside, “normal” group. The initial description of the rich man clearly
shows the mutual dependence of the positive and negative contours
of his piety. Positive piety: “do wont ein frum Man, der was reich und
gieng gern in die Kirchen”; negative piety: “und vermöcht sich nit wol
der Spilleut. Wa die waren oder kamen, da er was, da gieng er davon.”57
The prank inverts the relationship of inside to outside, thus relativizing the boundaries and exposing “proper” behavior as mere convention.
This is the political possibility Derrida sees in parasitic or fictional discourse, the “literatures” or “revolutions” against the “language-police”.
Moreover, the structure of iterability insists that the determination of
positive values (in our episode: “frum” “ehrlich”, etc.) is merely an hypostatization of convention. As Derrida reminds us:
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thing that can be excluded from or kept outside of the body “proper,” shut
out from the “familial” table or house.58

Again we can see how the two familiar interpretative possibilities would
arise from this episode. If we follow the authorial intention as the “serious” and legitimate meaning, we will conclude that Bote desired to
show the drastic implications of transgression against “normal” social propriety, to encourage those able to banish the dishonorable from
their home to do so, and to exhort those who could not to “light two
candles”, i.e. be on their guard whenever they were forced to have dealings with a Schalck. But if we legitimate non-serious language and find
serious meaning also in the parasitical “joke”, then we see that Till successfully destabilizes conventional social norms.
In this episode we also begin to see a point of mediation between the
two interpretations in the figure of the innkeeper. The financial relationship between Till and him relativizes the distinction between social
insider and outcast. Critics have suggested that the frequently appearing theme of money in TE reflects the economic transition occurring in
the late Middle Ages from an economy rooted in feudal bonds of obligation to a bourgeois market economy. Bote, it is argued, recognized the
potential danger in this transition insofar as it tended to dissolve traditional corporative bonds.59 His recommendation in the face of this social disintegration comes through the innkeeper’s admonition — by way
of a traditional proverb — to be careful. But the very fact that economic
relationships can threaten the old social order, the very fact that caution must struggle to enforce the distinction between inside and outside, indicates that Bote recognizes the fragility of the traditional order.
His anxiety arises as he considers that his society could be cutting itself
adrift from its anchorage in what he believed was a divinely instituted
order.
This underlying anxiety seems to be able to account both for Bote’s
intention to admonish, as well as the text’s structural ambiguity. His fear

The parasite is by definition never simply external, never simply some58. Derrida: Limited Inc, p. 232.
56. Ibid., p. 223 f.
57. Ibid., p. 221.

59. Wolfgang Fritz Haug: Die Einübung bürgerlicher Verkehrsformen bei
Eulenspiegel. In: Eulenspiegel-Interpretationen, p. 201-224; Bollenbeck: Till
Eulenspiegel, esp. p. 29-32, 100-109.
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that all societal norms are violable begins to undermine his intention
to exhort, because there seems to be no position immune from the attacks of parasitism. The retributive function of many of the episodes —
such as the two discussed above — suggests that if social norms are upheld, society will secure itself from Till’s transgressions. This has led
several critics to argue that the proper theme of the chapbook is not
the figure of Till at all, but the perverseness of the world (die Verkehrtheit der Welt).60 The theme of the “world upside-down” was pervasive
in the sixteenth century, and was often utilized for its polemical force.
Erasmus places Scholastic theology in the domain of Folly, implicitly
defending the role of humanistic scholarship; Reformation propaganda
places the papal tiara on the Whore of Babylon, implicitly giving an
apology for the new, evangelical theology.61 To a large extent we can
see the motif of the world upside-down similarly employed in service of
Bote’s social concerns: Till’s pranks negate an already existing negation
of what Bote perceives to be the “normal” order. But this model does
not account for those episodes where Till’s transgression is entirely unprovoked and does not serve to negate any vice. Here Bote seems to be
considering that even proper, traditional behavior is unable to protect
society from the force of disintegration as embodied in Till. In such episodes Bote cannot exhort his reader, and the model of the perversity of
the world cannot provide an adequate interpretation. Exhortation cannot cure Bote’s anxiety in the instances where there is no immune position that he can recommend to his reader.
60. Based on his discovery of Bote as the author, Peter Honegger was the
first to ask, “ob das, was uns der Verfasser des Volksbuches von seinem Helden erzählt, als thematisch geschickt geordnete Nachricht über einen historisch
nachweisbaren Till Eulenspiegel gemeint ist, oder ob nicht vielmehr der Ulenspiegel vor allem das wiedergibt, was sich der Verfasser über seine Umwelt gedacht hat. Es scheint, daß er uns mit einer genialen Satire über die Anmaßung
und Dummheit seiner Mitmenschen unterhalten will.” (Honegger: Ulenspiegel,
p. 126 f.) Alexander Schwarz (Verkehrte Welt im Ulenspiegel. In: Daphnis 15
[1986], p. 441-461) argues more stringently that the proper theme of TE is not
Till, but the perversity of the world.
61. See R.W. Scribner: For the Sake of Simple Folk. Popular Propaganda for
the German Reformation. Cambridge 1981, p. 164 f.
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Consider the 88th episode, where a peasant finds Till lying under a
tree, sick from having overimbibed and “einem todten Menschen gleicher dan einem lebendigen”.62 To the peasant passing by, marketbound, with a cart full of plums, Till moans:
Ach, gut Fründ, sich, hie bin ich so kranck drei Tag und Nacht on aller
Menschen Hilff hie gelegen, und wa ich noch einen Tag also ligen sol, so
möcht ich wol Hunger und Durst sterben. Darumb für mich umb Gots
willen für die Stat.63

Seeing Till’s poor condition and figuring he would have to lie in his
cart, the peasant at first refuses Till’s request, saying he would ruin his
plums. But Till insists he can ride on the front of the cart, so the peasant, a “frum Man”,64 plays the role of good Samaritan and helps Till
onto the cart. The story notes that the man was old, and it cost him considerable pain lifting Till. And he drove the cart slowly, to make his ailing guest more comfortable along the way. His reward? Till defecates
on his plums, rendering them unmarketable.
It is unlikely that sixteenth-century readers, steeped as they were in
the Bible, would fail to hear an allusion to the gospel account of the good
Samaritan in this episode. But with what a peculiar twist! The peasant,
initially torn between behaving according to his economic interests or
to a traditional morality, decides for the latter, only to be “punished”
for it. This episode demonstrates how deep-seated the anxieties generated by the increasingly shaky foundations of traditional society were.
It penetrates even to the foundations of moral and charitable behavior; even they are not inviolable. Surely this was an unhappy conclusion
for someone with Bote’s moral convictions, and it begins to undermine
his exhortatory intention in the chapbook. The transgressions in TE are
not always fixed to a program of reform. Their shifting locus becomes
symptomatic of a pervasive anxiety in the face of relativized or disintegrating “givens”.
62. Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 251.
63. Ibid., p. 251 f.
64. Ibid., p. 251.
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Summary
Till is the projection of anxieties arising in the face of social instability.
Bote, who was witness to just how fragile the given order of patrician
rule in Brunswick was, was sensible both to its weaknesses and to its
preferability to disorder. The shifting locus of perverseness in TE provides an adequate structure for Bote, who is critical of his society, but
uneasy about the forces threatening to tear it apart altogether. The violability of the order is so profound, that at times there seems to be no
position which can be defended against parasitic infection. Bote’s admonitory intention thus begins to turn in on itself, and the chapbook
assumes a highly ambiguous character. While vice clearly invites disorder, it seems that virtue, too, is subject to parasitic infection. No behavior, no place is immune. Till’s transgressions relativize the given order from top to bottom, inside to out. It is impossible to distill from the
chapbook’s many episodes a consistent lesson or moral, because of the
constantly shifting locus of perversity.
Derrida’s understanding of iterability and parasitic language provides us with a useful heuristic device in defining ambiguity as a structural principle in the chapbook. It allows the work to vacillate between
serious and non-serious language, between history and fiction. Interpreting according to authorial intention alone (SAT) flattens the work
by identifying only Bote’s admonitory voice, while overlooking how his
anxiety tends to undermine the very norms he intends to uphold. However there are limits to this heuristic device. Derrida’s polemic against
Searle is part of a larger philosophical project criticizing certain tendencies within the Western philosophical tradition. He posits structural ambiguity as the condition of all discourse. But I have employed
Derrida outside of this philosophical context. The structural ambiguity
we have discussed in TE is not a function of the text’s textuality. It is a
function of this specific text: its genre, its author, its historical context.
The book vacillates between fictionality and historicity by design. As
the author writes in the foreword, the book consists of “Historien und
Geschichten”.65 Claims to the hero’s historicity — dates, specific places
65. Ibid., p. 7.
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where Till was born, lived, and died, even an alleged gravestone — are
undermined by the willfully interjected anachronisms throughout the
narrative,66 and by the author’s acknowledgement that he included
material from other Schwänke. He even encourages his readers to add
their own tales to the collection.67 Derrida’s observation that “at the ‘origin’ of every speech act there can only be Societies which are (more or
less) anonymous, with limited responsibility or liability”68 also helps us
identify Bote’s deferral of authorial intention in TE. But this deferral is
not the Derridian deferral endemic to all writing. It is a literary convention with a specific historical function. We have seen that the volatile
social conditions in Brunswick may well have led Bote to defer his authorial liability to a “Society” (etlich Personen) in order to protect himself. Bote’s deferral of authorial intention also raises more far-reaching
questions concerning the emergence of the early modern author as a
subject in the early sixteenth century.69 The vacillation in TE between
“serious” and “non-serious” language is also specific to the work: the author employs citations out of context, or parasitic language, intentionally for its humorous effect. Derrida again gives us tools to identify this,
to do interpretive justice to more than a single, “serious” meaning. But
this vacillation, too, has a specific historical locus. Studies have touched
on the problem of “komischer Gehalt” and “gehaltvolle Komik” in TE,
casting it in terms of the contem- porary understanding of the relationship between ars iocandi and ars vivendi.70 It was believed that comical
66. Honegger: Ulenspiegel, p. 127-129.
67. Bote writes in the foreword that he included “etliche() Fabulen des Pfaff
Amis und des Pfaffen von dem Kalenberg”; he suggests that readers and listeners “gute kurtzweilige Fröden und Schwänck daruß fabulleren.” (Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 7 f.)
68. Derrida: Limited Inc, p. 216.
69. Peter Seibert: Der ‘tichter’ und ‘poeta’ am Beginn der Neuzeit. Einige Bemerkungen zum frühreformatorischen Autorentypus. In: LiLi. Zeitschrift für
Litdraturwissenschaft und Linguistik 11 (1981), No. 42, pp. 13-28.
70. Bollenbeck: Till Eulenspiegel, p. 187 f.; Heinz-Günter Schmitz: Physiologie des Scherzes. Bedeutung und Rechtfertigung der Ars Iocandi im 16. Jahrhundert. Hildesheim, NY 1972.
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literature served the revivifying function of replenishing humors dried
out by excessive worry. Works such as TE could drive away melancholy;
Luther himself recommended TE as a means of avoiding the devil’s Anfechtungen.71 In his foreword Bote suggests this medicinal purpose lies
at the heart of the book, which he wrote, he says, “umb ein frölich Gemüt zu machen in schweren Zeiten”.72 The philosophical context of deconstructive parasitism as it is employed against the intellectual constraints of “logocentrism”, tends to valorize the disruptive potential of
iterability. It finds in the transgressions against the “language police”
emancipatory “’revolutions’ that as yet have no model”. 73 We found that
Till’s parasitic language mirrors the instability of the social order of the
late medieval period. Bote intended to hold this mirror up as a warning, but it also reflects his uneasiness vis-à-vis the fragility, violability
and changeability of the order. While later readers would valorize this
potential, making Till into a positive hero, the historical context limits the parameters even of Bote’s non-intentional message. This message — that the order is violable — is a fearsome possibility in the early
sixteenth century, quite lacking the “Byronic chic” 74 it possesses today.
Derrida helps us get at this non-intentional message by showing the limits of authorial intention as an interpretive tool, and offering an alternative model of structural ambivalence. The heuristic device by which
we could avoid an interpretation overly-determined by context brings
us to a non-intentional meaning which itself is specific to the work’s
historical context. If we wish to understand the significance of Till’s
transgressions in the early sixteenth century, we must conclude that
71. “Die beste Arznei wieder die Anfechtung ist, daß du deine Gedanken
davon abwendest, das ist, redest von anderen Dingen, von Markofolo, Eulenspiegel und dergleichen lächerlichen Possen, so sich gar zu solchen Handeln
weder reimen noch dienen.” (Martin Luther, WA TR Vol. 1, No. 1089; cited by
Bollenbeck: Till Eulenspiegel, p. 315; and by Schmitz: Physiologie des Scherzes, p. 4.)
72. Dil Ulenspiegel, p. 7. See Schmitz: Physiologie des Scherzes, p. 82.
73. Derrida: Limited Inc, p. 243.
74. The phrase was coined by Denis Donoghue: Deconstructing Deconstruction. In: New York Review of Books 27 (1980), No. 10, p. 41.
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they were not revolutionary, but rather symptomatic of the anxiety
caused by a fearsome disintegration of traditional corporative bonds.
Of course this does not invalidate later interpretations of Till that valorize (or trivialize, as in children’s literature) his transgressions. The iterability of the text opens diachronically to a multiplicity of meanings
as the interpretive context shifts. But these, too, are to be understood in
their historical specificity.

